Imparcialidade e demarcação de valores na atividade científica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52712/issn.1850-0013-422Palavras-chave:
imparcialidade, valores não epistêmicos, nova demarcação de valores, ciência sem valores, ciências regulatóriasResumo
O artigo examina um novo tipo de tensão, identificada na filosofia das práticas científicas, entre a pretensão de desenvolver uma ciência imparcial e o fato aceito de que valores não epistêmicos são pressupostos na ciência. Para contextualizá-la e compreender os seus detalhes, apresentamos primeiro o ideal que lhe está subjacente, a ICV (ciência sem valores), cuja inconveniência é hoje abertamente reconhecida no campo da filosofia da ciência sobre valores (epistêmicos e não- epistêmico), especialmente no caso da busca por maior imparcialidade. A variedade de estudos sobre valores permitiu, no entanto, levantar um novo problema de demarcação, agora situado em contextos de incerteza e risco, centrado na legitimidade (ou ilegitimidade) dos valores que as atividades cognitivas pressupõem. Neste contexto surge a ligação entre os valores e a questão do conhecimento supostamente imparcial, para a qual propomos uma tentativa de solução.
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