Life, Technology, and Nature in the Thought of Gilbert Simondon
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52712/issn.1850-0013-844Keywords:
Simondon, philosophy of technology, biophilosophyAbstract
This work examines the relation between the natural and the artificial, and between living and technics, in the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. One of the attractions of Simondon’s thought is that he attempts to think technology from the perspective of a general theory of the living and of the human qua living. Nevertheless, there are certain problems that the Simondonian perspective cannot effectively engage with, such as the techno-genesis of the human and the problem of biotechnics. This article aims at analyzing the philosophy of technology from the point of view of individuation. All those scholars who have commented on Simondon’s philosophy of technology have concentrated exclusively on The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Nevertheless, this article will show that the Simondonian philosophy of artefacts must be read in the context of his philosophy of the living. This means that The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects must be examined in conjunction with his magnum opus, Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and of Information, like a continuous argument. In this manner, certain problems emerge: in particular, a certain framework that approaches the problem of concepts like “human”, “living” and “technology” from the perspective of already constituted individuals.
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