Multiple realizability and artifact kinds
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52712/issn.1850-0013-737Keywords:
multiple realizability, kinds, artifactsAbstract
The principle of multiple realizability is a good guide to our understanding of the artificial world. Whoever takes this principle as a guide faces the challenge of finding the appropriate level of functional description in order to shed light on the ontology of the artificial; at the same time, he or she faces the challenge of explaining how two types of realizations perform the same function, and how these realizations are ontologically different in a relevant sense. In this paper we examine the position of those who promote that arteficts can be grouped into nominal kinds, as well as the position of those who promote that they can be collected under real kinds. Finally, we suggest that it could be possible to preserve the principle of multiple realizability in a context where taxonomies depend on the descriptions of artifacts promoted by our practices, and on our learning about how there are exemplars of artifacts that realize functions differently.
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